We study two kinds of buy-it-now options, temporary and permanent, under a theoretical model of Stackelberg game. In this two-stage game, the bidders, as the followers, use a two-threshold strategy to determine whether to bid or directly buy the item at the posted price, given an auction configuration featured by the seller in the first stage and other common knowledge. Under the uniform distribution assumption for the bidders' valuation, we derive the optimal necessary conditions of the starting price and the buyit-now price for maximizing the seller's expected revenue. Then, we use two numerical experiments to find some interesting insights, which include that under identical bidders' participation costs, the temporary buy-it-now option can acquire a higher expected revenue for the seller than the permanent option, and a buy-it-now price auction always nontrivially dominates a regular auction in terms of the achieved expected revenue, no matter whether the seller or the bidders are risk-averse.
Introduction
A buy-it-now price, also called a buy price or buy-out price, is the maximum price set by an online auction seller at which he will sell an item immediately provided that a certain bidder bids this price. Now, in many online auction sites including eBay and Yahoo!, it is possible for a seller to augment his auction with a buy-it-now price. This kind of auction format, which is regarded as a hybrid of a regular auction and a fixed price setting (electronic catalogue), is introduced to solve two perceived drawbacks a regular online auction has in regard of a fixed price mechanism: Waiting time and price uncertainty. 2 The use of a buy-it-now price auction has been justified in "one-shot" auctions by appeal to impatience or risk aversion.
1 There are two kinds of buy-it-now price auctions -temporary and permanent. A temporary buy-it-now option disappears once a regular bid is submitted, whereas a permanent option remains available until it is exercised or the auction duration is exhausted. A temporary buy-it-now policy is adopted solely by eBay. Yahoo!, Amazon, and eBay EachNet adopt a permanent buy-it-now policy.
On one hand, the use of buy-it-now options is very popular in many online auction markets. 8, 21 On the other hand, from intuitions, the buy-it-now prices are puzzling: it makes sense for a seller at an auction to set a minimum bidding level (i.e. a starting price or a reserve price) surely, but a maximum? The discrepancy between the empirical findings and the logical intuitions has inspired researchers to consider the following questions:
(1) In a buy-it-now price auction, what is the bidders' optimal strategic reaction to the auction parameters, and what is the seller's decision in order to maximize the expected revenue from the auction? (2) Can a buy-it-now price auction bring the seller a non-neglectable advantage to the regular auction in terms of the expected revenue? (3) Which kind of buy-it-now options is more preferable?
To answer the above questions, the two-threshold strategy of bidders in buy-itnow price auctions was introduced by Gupta and Gallien 2 and Wang et al. 19 Gupta and Gallien 2 formulated a game-theoretical model featuring time-sensitive bidders with uniform valuations and Poisson arrivals. They characterized equilibrium bidder strategies in both the temporary and permanent cases and then solved the problem of maximizing the seller's utility by a simulation. The main drawbacks of their study are three-folded. First, they did not consider the bidders' participation cost; second, they did not study the optimality of the starting price instead of equalizing it to the lowest valuation among all the bidders; and third, the optimal strategies of the bidders and seller are too complicated to be computed in practice. Wang et al. 19 set up a two-stage theoretical game model to investigate how the optimal buy-it-now price is influenced by the key factors such as the bidders' participation cost, the seller's reserve price and the number of potential bidders. However, they only considered a temporary buy-it-now option, and there are several errors in the derivation of the expected revenue from a buy-it-now price auction. Furthermore, they did not take into consideration the time-sensitivity of bidders in their model.
To avoid the deficiencies in the existing studies, based on the ideas of Refs. 2 and 19, we try to develop a theoretical model of Stackelberg game to study the two kinds of buy-it-now options, temporary and permanent, within a unitive framework. In this two-stage game, the bidders use a two-threshold strategy to determine whether to bid or directly buy the item at the posted price, given the auction configuration featured by the seller in the first stage and other common knowledge. Under the uniform distribution assumption, we derive the optimal necessary conditions of the starting price and the buy-it-now price for maximizing the seller's expected revenue. Although, the optimal starting price and the optimal buy-it-now price are difficult to be found analytically, we use two numerical experiments to find some interesting insights, which include that, under the identical bidders' participation costs, a temporary buy-it-now option can acquire a higher expected revenue for the seller than a permanent option (this result is contrary to that of Ref. 2) , and a buy-it-now price auction nontrivially dominates a regular auction in terms of the achieved expected revenue.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. After a review of the related literature in Sec. 2, we present a brief introduction of the current Stackelberg game theoretical model in Sec. 3 . Then, we analyze the bidders' and seller's optimal strategies in Sec. 4, based on which we construct the expected revenue functions of both temporary and permanent buy-it-now price auctions. We carry out two numerical experiments in Sec. 5 to induce several important insights about the buy-it-now option. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Literature Review
Buy-it-now prices in online auctions were first noted by Lucking-Reiley, 7 as buy-out prices, in his empirical overview of auction activities on the Internet. He explicitly posed this as a challenge to theorists for its popularity and ostensible irrationality. Some papers also quoted evidences to suggest that the exercise of buy-it-now price options is not uncommon in online auctions. Reynolds and Wooders 14 surveyed the buy-it-now price auctions in Yahoo! and eBay. The categories sampled on March 27, 2002, were automobiles, clothing, DVD players, VCR's, digital cameras and TV sets. Totally, 1248 auctioned items were sampled from Yahoo!, of which 842 had a buy-it-now price posted by the seller (roughly, 66%). In a similar fashion, 31,142 auctioned items were sampled from eBay, of which 12,480 had a buy-it-now price posted by the seller (roughly, 40%). Although there is some variation across the categories of goods sampled, the percentage of buy-it-now prices never drops below 25% in that sample. Hence, in those categories, at least, the appearance of buy-itnow prices is very frequent. For eBay, Mathews 8 presented another evidence: for two categories of games (racing and sports) for Sony PS2, on January 29-30, 2001, 210 items were on offer and a buy-it-now option was available on 124 items (59%). So, at least in these categories, the buy-it-now price auction is very popular. According to Yu et al., 21 the practice of buy-it-now price is indeed very popular in eBay EachNet. Totally 75.7% (1048 out of 1384) of auctions in that study were augmented by a buy-it-now option to attract the risk-averse bidders. Especially in the category of Home, Decorations, Commodities, and Pets and Musical Instruments, Movies, and Cartoons, 91.9% and 90.8%, respectively, of the sellers posted the maximum prices they would accept immediately. May be it is partly because that most of the merchandizes in these categories are homogeneous and the competition among the sellers in these categories is very severe. While a lower percentage (roughly 30%) of auctions in the category of Art, Crafts, and Collectibles and Jewelry and Watches used the buy-it-now option, the sellers of these merchandizes are reluctant to set any buy-it-now price to limit the room for an increase in values.
From intuitions, it seems stupid for a seller to limit the increase of the final price with a posted buy-it-now price. While, in fact, we can see that if one bidder wanted to obtain the item immediately, the buy-it-now price will be a good choice for all the seller, buyer and auction site, because all the three parties can at least save time costs. Budish and Takeyama 1 explored the use of buy-it-now prices in online auctions and provided a rational explanation for this seemingly irrational auction mechanism. The main result is that augmenting an English auction with a buy-it-now price can improve the seller's profits by partially insuring (and therefore increasing the expected payment from) some risk-averse bidders. But the equilibrium analysis in Ref. 1 is based on an independent private value auction in which there is one profit-maximizing seller and only two bidders with discrete high and low types respectively. Clearly, the natural extension of Budish and Takeyama's work is to consider a more general setting with n bidders, perhaps having continuously distributed valuations.
To develop a methodology for finding temporary and permanent buy-it-now prices that maximize the seller's discounted revenue, and to examine the relative benefits of using each type of option in various environments, Gupta and Gallien 2 formulated a model featuring time-sensitive bidders with uniform valuations and Poisson arrivals (but endogenous bidding times). They characterized equilibrium bidder strategies in both cases and then solved the problem of maximizing the seller's utility by a simulation. Subsequent, numerical experiments suggested that a seller can increase his revenue significantly by introducing a buy-it-now option. Additionally, whereas a temporary buy-it-now option promotes early bidding, a permanent option gives an incentive to the bidders to bid later, thus leading to concentrated bids near the end of the auction. Although permanent buy-out options yield higher expected revenues than that of temporary options, they may not be always more desirable.
By noting that trading in online auctions is not of a "one-shot" nature and that market participants expect more transactions in the future, Kirkegaard and Overgaard 4 showed that an early seller has an incentive to introduce a buy-it-now price, if similar products are offered later on by other sellers. The buy-it-now price will increase the revenue in the current auction, but revenues in future auctions will decrease, as will the sum of the revenues. In contrast, when a single seller owns multiple units, the overall revenue will increase, if buyers anticipate the use of buy-it-now price in the future by this seller. Thus a sophisticated seller with several units can increase the sum of revenues by introducing a buy-it-now price in later auctions that is contingent on the outcome of earlier auctions. In both of the cases, an optimally chosen buy-it-now price introduces potential inefficiencies in the allocation. Throughout that paper the authors assumed that the potential bidders have multi-unit demands, with a diminishing marginal utility.
Nowadays, firms are increasingly adopting auctions as an additional channel to expand online sales. 13 Many well-known firms such as IBM, Sony, Sears, and Sun Microsystems, have set up storefronts and are actively auctioning off their products at eBay. The growing popularity of auctions presents an interesting pricing decision for managers: whether to use a regular auction or a buy-it-now auction to market products. By posting a fixed-price at an auction, the seller provides customers a convenient option to directly buy the item without bidding. However, in doing so, the seller also explicitly imposes a maximum bidding level that could limit the potential revenue. By noting that a customer's participation cost (which refers to all transaction costs associated with bidding, such as costs due to waiting for the auction to end, the cost involved in learning the auction rules, and the opportunity cost incurred during the bidding process) is an important consideration for a consumer decision process in an information-intensive environment, Wang et al. 19 set up a theoretical model and indicated that the optimal buy-it-now price is influenced by the key factors such as the customer's participation cost, the seller's reserve price, and the number of potential customers. The results show that the participation cost can reduce the seller's revenue under a traditional auction format. The buy-it-now feature offers the seller a flexible marketing tool to reduce the inefficiency in the transaction. It can increase both a firm's profit and a customer' utility. The participation cost is clearly an important consideration for a seller to determine an auction format. However, much of the auction research ignores the participation cost and takes a bidder's full participation as given. Additionally, they empirically tested the predictions of the theoretical model by using real-time data from eBay.
Reynolds and Wooders 15 analyzed buy-it-now price English auctions of an indivisible good with the general setting of n bidders with continuous and independently distributed private valuations. They proved that if the seller and bidders are riskneutral, a buy-it-now price would not affect the auction outcome. If the seller or bidders are risk-averse, a buy-it-now price English auction can actually provide the seller a higher expected revenue than that of a traditional English auction. Hidvégi et al. 3 also found that, in the presence of risk aversion from either the bidders or the seller, a buy-it-now price does increase the seller's expected revenue. However, in their model, when participants are not time-sensitive, bidders' utilities do not increase through the use of a buy-it-now option. In a series of three papers investigating variations of the same basic model, Mathews 9-11 focused instead on the temporary buy-it-now option. Specifically, he considered a fixed number of timesensitive bidders with different arrival times, and explicitly captured the fact that early bidders may prevent later ones from exercising the option. He showed that a risk averse or time-sensitive seller facing either risk neutral or risk averse bidders will choose a buy-it-now price ensuring that the buy-it-now option is exercised with a positive probability; he also found that, depending on the valuation distribution, the buy-it-now option either makes all bidders weakly better off, or low valuation bidders weakly better off and high valuation bidders strictly worse off.
A Game Theoretical Model
Here, we use the basic idea of Ref. 19 to analyze the strategies of seller and bidders at a buy-it-now price auction.
According to the procedure and rule of buy-it-now price auctions, we set our model as a two-stage sequential game ( Fig. 1 ). In the first stage, the seller sets the starting price s and decides whether to augment the regular online auction with a buy-it-now price B, given that she has knowledge about an estimate of the number of potential bidders n, an estimate of the bidders' participation cost c, and the distribution of the potential bidders' valuations for the item being auctioned.
a In the second stage, the bidders observe the seller's decision (the auction configuration), and make decisions on the participation and way to purchase, bidding or buying directly at the posted price B. If we treat the bidders as a unity (denoted as BIDDER), then our model becomes a Stackelberg game, in which the seller, as the leader, features the auction by setting parameters such as a starting price s and a buy-it-now price B; the BIDDER, as the follower, receives the information of the auction and decides whether to bid or buy directly at B. a We assume here that the option of a hidden reserve price is not available.
Information
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Assumption 1. Auction configuration
We assume a single-period auction for a risk-neutral seller who uses an eBay-like auction to sell one item. The bidders will use eBay's proxy bidding system to place bids according to their maximal willingness-to-pay (WTP) for the auctioned item. When the fixed time of the auction duration ends, the bidder who places the highest bid wins the item but only needs to pay the second highest bid price plus a negligible small increment. This auction rule is effectively equivalent to the second-price sealed bid auction, under which the bidders' weakly dominant strategy is to bid her true valuation. 18 We assume that the seller owns the item and can endogenously sets the starting bid price s. The seller's decision in the first stage of the game is whether to incorporate a buy-it-now option into a regular auction with a starting price s. There are n potential bidders in the market who are aware of the auction and may be interested in purchasing the item, where n ≥ 2. We assume that this is an independent private value auction in which each bidder knows her own valuation for the auctioned item perfectly, but only knows that all the other bidders' valuations are drawn from the same distribution with a cumulative distribution function (c
, which is common knowledge for all the bidders and seller. In fact, we can also assume that each bidder has taken the time sensitivity into account when formulating her own valuation and belief of others' valuation distribution. The valuation of a bidder is composed of two parts: The valuation of the item and the time-sensitivity compensation. Therefore, we do not need to consider the time sensitivity explicitly in our model, but still can capture this important nature. For simplicity and easy explanatory, in all the discussions below, we assume that the bidders' valuations are independently and identically drawn from a uniform distribution on the interval [0, 1], i.e.
(This assumption is very popular in the study of auction theory. 5, 6, 18 ) In summary, the common knowledge of bidders includes the starting price s, the buy-it-now price B (if available), the estimates of the number of potential bidders at the auction n, the participation cost c, and the bidders' valuation distribution.
Assumption 2. Bidders' participation cost at an auction
It is straightforward to assume that the participation cost c falls in between the lower and upper bounds of the valuation distribution, i.e. c ∈ [0, 1). This is a mild assumption since we assume that after offsetting the participation cost, a bidder can still derive some positive surplus. It is a trivial case when the auction participation cost is higher than the upper bound of the valuation distribution, because no one will participate in the auction. A bidder only incurs her participation cost upon submitting a bid to the auction. This participation cost is mainly referred to the opportunity cost incurred by inspecting the auction progress, negotiating the deal matters with the seller and entailing risk of fraud and so on. This contrasts with the entry cost presenting in other auction researches which require a bidder to pay a fee to know her valuation. We believe that this assumption better represents the online auctions observed in practice.
Assumption 3. Bidders' endogenous participation decisions
Because bidders incur a cost when they engage in bidding, it is natural to assume that they follow a rule when making "bid" or "buy directly" decisions. We assume that they solve for "cutoff points" or "thresholds" internally by calculating the expected revenue for each choice and act optimally given their own valuations. This assumption will be discussed further in the following section.
Players' Strategies
Bidders' strategy
We use a backward induction procedure to solve the Stackelberg game. The first problem that needs to be solved is the bidders' optimal strategy in the second stage, given the auction configuration made by the seller in the first stage and other common knowledge. For tractability, we limit our attention to pure strategies. We begin by studying a bidder's decision process when he arrives at a particular regular auction. We index the bidder by subscript i. According to Assumption 3, there exists a threshold t a that if the bidder's valuation v i is smaller than t a , she will not submit a bid, thus obtains zero surplus. If v i > t a , bidder i has the option of submitting a bid or buying the item directly at the posted buy-it-now price B. If she participates (by submitting a bid) and wins, then her revenue is the surplus (excess value above the maximum of the second highest bid and the starting bid s) less the participation cost c. Thus, bidder i's revenue is:
where (x) + refers to the positive part of x, z = max{v 1 , . . . , v i−1 , v i+1 , . . . , v n } is the highest valuation among the other bidders, and n refers to the number of potential bidders for this auction. A participation threshold (t a ) is defined as the valuation at which the bidder is indifferent between bidding and not bidding. In the following analysis, the "participation-threshold" is used to refer to the borderline valuation, above which a potential bidder will participate in the bidding process.
b An equivalent way of understanding this threshold is to consider that with a valuation equal to t a , a bidder can win the item only if she is the only bidder. 12, 16, 17 Then bidder i's expected revenue of bidding given n bidders is
where g(z) is the probability density function (p.d.f.) of the highest valuation among the other n − 1 bidders. Equation (2) implies that v i ≥ t a . The expression for ER i (v i ) is obtained by considering the following two conditions. The first condition is that no other bidder's valuation surpasses the participation threshold t a , i.e. bidder i is the unique bidder who can afford the bidding. Because the starting price is s, the revenue resulting from this condition is v i − s and occurs with the probability [F (t a )] n−1 . The second condition is that at least one another bidder can bid too, the revenue resulting from this condition is thus (v i − z) provided that the highest valuation among other bidders is less than v i .
According to the theory of order statistics, the p.d.f. of the rth (of n variables) highest order statistic v
Thus, g(z) = (n − 1)F (z) n−2 f (z). Plugging g(z) into Eq. (2) and integrating by parts, we get
The participation threshold t a by definition solves the zero-profit condition defined by Eq. (4):
Under the uniform assumption that F (x) = x, x ∈ [0, 1], this reduces to
Plugging Eq. (6) into Eq. (4), we get the expected revenue of submitting a bid for an eligible bidder with a valuation v i > t a as follows:
If upon arrival the buy-it-now option is available, the bidder may execute this option and immediately purchase the item at the posted price B. The buy-it-now option is available if no other bidders have submitted a bid (in the case of temporary buy-it-now option) or have already executed it. When the buy-it-now option is present, a bidder must ex ante evaluate both options before making the purchase decision. She has to evaluate the expected revenues from both the "buy" and "bid" options. In this case, a buy-threshold t b defines the valuation at which the bidder is indifferent between the two options, conditional on participation. Therefore, the buy-threshold solves the following indifferent condition:
It is straightforward to see that the expected revenue from buying the item directly at the posted price B for this bidder is
Therefore the buy-threshold defined in Eq. (8) solves 
Similarly, Eq. (10) implies
Lemma 2. The bidder's expected revenue curves for buying and bidding intersect at most once (in the non-negative domain).
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Note that the expected revenue function of bidding is convexly increasing with a slope less than 1 in the interval of (t a , 1):
While, the expected revenue function of buying directly at the posted price B is a straight line with the slope being exactly equal to one. Figure 2 plots a bidder's expected revenue from bidding (the dashed line) and buying (the straight line) over the range of possible valuations. The intersection of the bidding expected revenue curve and the zero revenue line (the horizontal line) defines the participationthreshold t a , and the intersection of the expected revenue of bidding and buying curves indicates the buy-threshold t b . The above analysis and Fig. 2 are useful in understanding the bidder behavior at an online auction with a buy-it-now price. The position of the two curves guides the optimal action that a bidder should take: To bid or to exercise the buy-it-now option. The bidders' optimal strategy in the buy-it-now auction is a two-threshold strategy, summarized in Theorem 1. 
Theorem 1. In a buy-it-now auction, the following symmetric equilibrium exists for potential bidders, which involves two thresholds, the participation-threshold (t a )
(2) When the buy-it-now option is not available, which means the buy-it-now option is temporary and a certain earlier bidder has placed a bid, the auction becomes a standard second price sealed bid auction and the optimal bidding strategy for a bidder is to bid her true valuation conditional upon her participation.
Seller's expected revenue maximization problem
Now we consider the game's first stage: The seller's decision about what the starting price s should be, and whether to initiate a buy-it-now option and if so what price should be set. The seller's decision is based upon the bidders' strategy discussed in the previous section. Seeing that there are two kinds of buy-it-now options, temporary and permanent, we discuss the seller's strategy under each of them subsequently.
A Temporary buy-it-now option
Under a temporary buy-it-now price auction such as employed in eBay, the buy-itnow option will disappear after the first bidder submits a bid. Therefore, the auction format may be changed by bidders' strategy. Resulting from Eq. (10), various buyit-now prices determine different buy-thresholds, which can lead to different action spaces for bidders. The seller not only needs to choose a posted price B, but also needs to consider the resulting selling format. For example, if the buy-it-now price is set lower than the participation-threshold, then the "bid" option disappears from a bidder's decision space. This happens since a bidder with a valuation greater than the participation-threshold would not want to bid because the potential gain from bidding never exceeds directly exercising the buy-it-now option. For bidders with a valuation lower than the posted price, they will not buy since this will generate a negative surplus. Bidding is not an option either, since it requires an even higher threshold. Therefore, a price set lower than the participation threshold will result in a "pure" fixed-price format similar to the usual retail environment. If on the other hand the buy-it-now price is set too high then bidding is preferred. A buy-itnow auction only occurs when bidders perceive a chance for the auction to change its format, namely, a chance for bidding as well as the opportunity to exercise a buy-it-now option. These cases are shown in Fig. 3 . The seller gets an expected revenue equal to that of a regular auction when posting a price B ≥ p 2 , and a revenue of the standard fixed-price when B ≤ p 1 . The revenue associated with the buy-it-now price is achieved when p 1 < B < p 2 . According to Lemma 2, the expected revenue curves of buying at the posted price B and bidding intersect at most once. Therefore, we can solve for the bounds on the pricing solution to identify when a buy-it-now auction occurs:
where p 1 is achieved by solving:
n a n = 0 and p 2 is the B who solves ER buy (1) = ER bid (1). The above analysis suggests that posting a fixed price can result in different auction formats, hence different expected revenue functions. The seller needs to consider the impact of the selected price B on the auction format and adopts the price and format that yield the highest expected revenue. Now, we consider each of these three formats and determine the optimal pricing decision for the seller. As we noted earlier, any buy-it-now price lower than the participation-threshold, i.e. B < t a , yields a pure, fixed-price strategy. Furthermore, if B > 1 − 1−t n a n , the price posted at the auction has no effect since bidding gives bidders a higher expected revenue than buying for all possible valuations. Consequently, the buy-it-now auction becomes a regular auction. Therefore, the seller's expected revenue is a step function:
We denote π t c , π t b , and π t a as the expected revenues from a fixed-price setting, a buy-it-now auction, and a regular auction, respectively. We derive the generated expected revenue of each type as follows.
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The expected revenue a seller facing n bidders in a fixed-price setting is π t c = B × Prob (at least one bidder has valuation higher than B)
This function is concave and has a unique maximum. It should be noted that π
The expected revenue of a regular auction with endogenous participation equals the profit from those who participate in bidding: (2) . (15) If bidders' valuations follow a uniform distribution on [0, 1], this simplifies to:
Next we examine the revenue from a buy-it-now auction. As the nature of temporary buy-it-now price auction, after the starting bid price or the hidden reserve price is met the buy-it-now option disappears, hence the arrival process is important in assessing the auction. To obtain the seller's expected revenue, we need to condition upon the first bidder's action. Bidders are indexed as i = 1, 2, . . . , n. If the first bidder quits the auction without doing anything, i.e. v 1 < t a , then the second bidder faces the same decision: To buy at the posted price, to bid, or not to participate in. Note that v 1 < t a is a sufficient condition for the first bidder to take no action. The posted price B must be higher than the participation threshold in order for buy-it-now auction to occur. This process continues until the auction receives a bidder who either submits a bid or ends the auction by exercising the buy-it-now option, or the auction ends spontaneously without receiving any bids from n bidders. The decision scenario of a temporary buy-it-now price auction is plotted in Fig. 4 (till bidder 3) . From the intuition of Fig. 4 and logical analysis, we can get the expected revenue for the temporary buy-it-now auctions π t b as Fig. 4 . Decision scenario of a temporary buy-it-now price auction.
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follows:
The expression for π t b is obtained by considering the following four auction outcomes. The first outcome is that no bidder has a valuation surpassing the participation threshold t a , i.e. no one will be interested in the auction in which case the item does not sell at the auction. The auction revenue increasing from this outcome is zero and occurs with the probability F n (t a ). This zero revenue is thus omitted in Eq. (17) . The second outcome is that only one (out of n) bidder has the valuation falling into the interval [t a , t b ] and all the others have valuations lower than the participation threshold t a , in which case the seller can earn the starting price s. The combined probability of this event is
. The third outcome is that a certain bidder executes the buy-it-now option. This will happen when all the earlier bidders have not submitted a bid or executed the buy-it-now option (i.e. all the bidders have valuations below t a ), and the current bidder has a valuation above the buy-participation threshold t b . The combined probability of this event is ( 
. The seller can earn B in this case. The last outcome is that a bidder submits a bid and makes the buy-it-now option disappear, this will happen when his valuation falls into the interval [t a , t b ]. Conditional on this, i − 1 other bidders have valuations above t a and the remaining n − i bidders have valuations below t a (with the probability
. According to the discussion of a bidders' bidding strategy in the second price auctions, the revenue from this case is the expected value of the second highest valuation among all the bidders who submit a bid. For 2 ≤ i ≤ n such bidders, the c.d.f. of their valuations is 1] . Therefore, the expected value of the second highest valuation among the i bidders should be
Again, under the assumption of a uniform distribution on [0, 1], the expression for π p b can be rewritten as:
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The seller's problem is to choose an optimal buy-it-now price B * to maximize the total expected revenue:
In order to decide on the optimal starting price s and buy-it-now price B, the seller first computes the optimal price in each of the three intervals of B: the fixedprice interval [0, p 1 ], the buy-it-now auction interval (p 1 , p 2 ), and the auction-only interval [p 2 , 1]. Then the seller picks the pricing decision that yields the greatest expected revenue amongst the three.
In the following, we will derive the optimal starting price s * and buy-it-now price B * to maximize the expected revenue from a buy-it-now auction π (6) and (10) to replace s with t a and B with t b in Eq. (19), respectively.
The first order necessary optimality conditions give:
and
So, the optimal starting price s * and buy-it-now price B * should make the corresponding t * a and t * b meet Eqs. (21) and (22) simultaneously. To assure the expected revenue π t b achieves the local maximum at the extremal point (t * a , t * b ), the Hesse matrix should be negative definite:
Seeing that the first order conditions (21) and (22) are very hard to solve analytically, we will consider in the following the condition that the starting price s = 0. Now, s = 0, t a = c n . The first order necessary condition becomes:
The second order condition gives:
Therefore, we can get the following theorem. 
A permanent buy-it-now option
Different from a temporary buy-it-now option that remains open from the beginning until its exercise or the first time that a regular bid is submitted by any bidder, a permanent buy-it-now option remains open until its exercise or the end of the auction. That is, in the permanent buy-it-now auctions, even though some earlier bidders have submitted some bids, the current bidder still has the choice between bidding or buying it directly at the posted price B. In this case, the decision scenario of an auction process is different from that of temporary buy-it-now auctions. We plot it in Fig. 5 (till bidder 3) . Again, from the intuition of Fig. 5 and logical analysis, we can get the expected revenue for the permanent buy-it-now auctions π p b as follows:
The expression for π p b is obtained by considering the following four auction outcomes. The first outcome is that no bidder has a valuation surpassing the participation threshold t a , i.e. no one will be interested in the auction in which case the item will not be sold at the auction. The auction revenue resulting from this outcome is zero and occurs with the probability F n (t a ). This zero revenue is thus omitted in Eq. (25). The second outcome is that only one (out of n) bidder has a valuation falling into the interval [t a , t b ] and all the others have valuations lower than the participation threshold t a , in which case the seller can earn the starting price s. The probability of this event is
. The third outcome is that at least one bidder has a valuation higher than the buythreshold t b (with the probability 1 − F (t b ) n ), i.e. the auction will be ended by the first bidder who executes the buy-it-now option, so the seller can get B in this case. The last outcome is that at least two bidders have valuations falling into the interval [t a , t b ] and all the others have valuations lower than the participation threshold t a (with the probability
. Using the similar discussion to the previous section, we can get the revenue from such i bidders as: Table 1 lists t b corresponding to various values of n when the participation cost is zero. It turns out that as the number of bidders increases, Eq. (31) is more likely to be satisfied. Especially when n ≥ 10, the threshold t b is higher than 0.97, which makes Eq. (31) to be met even more easily. Therefore, we can get the following theorem. 
Numerical Experiments
Although we cannot compare the expected revenues from temporary and permanent buy-it-now auctions analytically, we can put up several numerical experiments to explore some insights. We set two levels of participation cost, c = 0.01 and c = 0.001. Under each condition, we calculate the corresponding optimal parameters based on the results obtained in previous two sections. results. We continue our numerical experiments by letting the starting price be zero and present the corresponding results in Table 3 . From the numerical results, we can get the following propositions.
Conclusion Remarks
By avoiding the deficiencies of Refs. 2 and 19, we have developed a theoretical model of Stackelberg game to study the two kinds of buy-it-now options, temporary and permanent, within a unitive framework. In this two-stage game, the bidders use a two-threshold strategy to determine whether to bid or buy the item directly at the posted price, given the auction configuration featured by the seller in the first stage, and other common knowledge, such as an estimate of the number of the potential bidders, the bidders' participation cost and the distribution of bidders' valuations. It should be noted that in our models, we have assumed the time sensitivity, which is a non-neglectable characteristics of online auction bidders, and is integrated into the valuations of bidders. On one hand, it simplifies the analysis of our model; on the other hand, the time-sensitivity nature of bidders can still be captured. Under the uniform distribution assumption, we have derived the optimal necessary conditions of the starting price and the buy-it-now price for maximizing the seller's expected revenue. Seeing that the optimal starting price and the buy-it-now price are very hard to be solved analytically, we have presented some numerical experiments and found several interesting insights, which include that under the identical bidders' participation cost, (1) the optimal starting price and the optimal buy-it-now price for a temporary option are less than those of a permanent option; (2) a temporary buy-it-now option can acquire a higher expected revenue for the seller than a permanent option (this result is contrary to that of Ref.
2), and (3) a buy-it-now price auction nontrivially dominates a regular auction in terms of the achieved expected revenue.
The results obtained in this paper have shown that even though the bidders and seller are risk-neutral, a buy-it-now price auction can still produce a higher expected revenue for the seller than a regular auction. This explains why the buyit-now price auctions are very popular in the online auction market. In practice, as long as the posted buy-it-now price is sufficiently attractive to at least one bidder, the time cost of all the seller, bidder and auction site will be saved. However, a too low buy-it-now price will decrease the seller's expected revenue. So, the discussion in this paper can help the sellers in online auctions on how to set an optimal buy-itnow price, as well as the corresponding optimal starting price. The policy of using a buy-it-now option may not only improve the auction's expected revenue, but also speed up the transactions in online auction markets.
